From Rebels to Rulers: The Syrian Situation

The cruel and callous Assad regime crumbled before the world’s eyes in December 2024. It had been brought to its knees by rebel forces, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and his militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In a matter of days, the rebels had gone from being a pugnacious band of irregular fighters with limited regional experience of governance to the de facto ruling authority in Syria. Their mission was clear: to restore peace, stability and unity to a nation wounded by years of violence, tyranny, and deep-seated division.  Four months on, however, Al-Sharaa and his militiamen have still yet to prove that Syria’s future is in capable hands. Their first step to gaining the trust of the Syrian people must be to establish control over the country’s dangerously fragile internal security. 

Al-Sharaa and HTS are not the first irregular fighters in the region to transition from insurgents to government forces. In 1948, following the establishment of the state of Israel, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were formed, uniting various paramilitary groups such as the Haganah and Irgun (Vardi 2009). A more extensive transition occurred when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. Having spent 20 years fighting Western forces as insurgents, the Taliban regained control of the country and has since established a firm grip on power (Hakimi 2025). Unlike the IDF, the Taliban have not merely become the military wing of a state but rather have assumed the role of governing, becoming the state itself. Al-Sharaa and his men have made this same transition in Syria. 

Al-Sharaa and HTS have experience governing, but on a much smaller scale. Prior to toppling Assad’s regime, Al Sharaa (previously known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Julani) and HTS governed Idlib province in Northwest Syria. Having broken ties with both Al Qaeda and ISIS, Al Sharaa and HTS fought off rival factions to consolidate power in the region, establishing bureaucratic systems, raising taxes and providing services to local residents (Holtz 2023). While Al Sharaa’s regional government in Idlib implemented a more moderate interpretation of Sharia law compared to groups like ISIS, he ruled as an authoritarian, with little tolerance towards any forms of political resistance (Holtz 2023). 

Having ascended to power as Syria’s president, Al Sharaa’s provincial authoritarianism has given way, at least in part, to legal foundations for a free and fair future for the Syrian people. A temporary constitution signed at the beginning of March enshrined inclusivity for all, freedom of expression, and the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers as foundational principles of a new Syrian society (Alsayed and Chehayeb 2025). Al-Sharaa reiterated his government’s commitment to transforming Syria by saying he hoped to “replace oppression with justice” (Gritten 2025). Though encouraging, these words will mean very little without control of the country’s internal security. As outlined by Herbert Wulf, the “inability to provide security is a defining criterion of the fragility of states” (Wulf 2011). Al-Sharaa must first ensure a monopolisation of arms within the country before any long-lasting political transformation can take place. Without this, Al-Sharaa’s authority and his desire for stability could be abruptly undermined at any moment.  

At the end of January, Al-Sharaa made significant strides towards stabilising the security situation when he compelled 18 armed anti-Assad factions to integrate themselves into a national army under the command of his government (Sharawi 2025). By mid-March, Al-Sharaa had fortified this securitisation process when he obtained the same agreement from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (Zelin 2025). However, this agreement does not immediately resolve Al-Sharaa’s security issues. The new army will take time to professionalise, as factions will need to build trust and rapport before they can operate as a unified force. Additionally, Al-Sharaa’s command and control have already come under threat from Assad-loyalist Alawite militias who attacked government forces in early March (The Economist 2025). The resulting massacre of 800 Alawites by government-backed, Sunni militia fighters will have alienated these groups and sown seeds for the return of sectarian violence that was endemic during Assad’s rule (Zelin 2025). 

Al-Sharaa’s security problem is also complicated by pressure from external regional actors. Turkish-Israeli relations have soured since the war in Gaza and are now complicating Al-Sharaa’s task in pacifying Syria. Amid talks of a defence pact being signed between Turkey and the new Syrian administration, Israel has continued to bombard military targets in Syria, having already positioned troops along Syria’s south-west border. Israel claims it is preventing military assets formerly controlled by Assad from falling into “enemy hands,” while Turkey has warned that Israel is merely “causing chaos and feeding terrorism” (Williamson 2025). 

Stability in Syria remains an unrealised ambition. Al Sharaa is yet to demonstrate to watchful eyes around the globe, including the Syrian people, that his regime is capable of governing. He must prioritise establishing a monopoly on the use of force, quelling both internal and external pressure, in order to usher in peace and stability. Otherwise, Syria risks slipping back into the throes of civil war. 

Sources

Ahmed Sharawi. 2025. “From Al-Qaeda Commander to Syrian President: Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s Ascent.” FDD. February 3, 2025. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/02/03/from-al-qaeda-commander-to-syrian-president-ahmad-al-sharaas-ascent/.

Alsayed, Ghaith, and Kareem Chehayeb. 2025. “Syrian Leader Signs Constitution That Puts the Country under an Islamist Group’s Rule for 5 Years.” AP News. March 13, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/syria-constitution-assad-alsharaa-4caa2074f20155c2399451d9669e435b.

Gritten, David. 2025. “Syria Gets Temporary Constitution for Five-Year Transition.” BBC News, March 14, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c70ely2p6e4o.

Hameed Hakimi. 2025. “What the West Can Do Now in Taliban-Ruled Afghanistan.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. February 5, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/what-west-can-do-now-taliban-ruled-afghanistan.

Holtz, Mackenzie. 2023. “Examining Extremism: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) .” Www.csis.org. August 3, 2023. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts.

The Economist. 2025. “Time Is Running out for Syria’s President.” The Economist. March 13, 2025. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/03/13/time-is-running-out-for-syrias-president.

Vardi, Gil-li. 2009. “Learning without Reference: The Israeli Defence Forces in Its First Twenty Years.” Rusi.org. 2009. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/learning-without-reference-israeli-defence-forces-its-first-twenty-years.

Williamson, Lucy. 2025. “Israeli Strikes in Syria a Challenge to Turkey.” BBC News, April 4, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx27y7e2vk9o.

Wulf, Herbert. 2011. “The Privatization of Violence: A Challenge to State-Building and the Monopoly on Force.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 18 (1): 137.

Zelin, Aaron . 2025. “Syria’s Transitional Honeymoon Is over after Massacres and Disinformation.” The Washington Institute. 2025. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syrias-transitional-honeymoon-over-after-massacres-and-disinformation.